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Bosch and the Binding Effect of State Court
Adjudications upon Subsequent Federal
Tax Litigation
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the unique facets of American federalism involves the
interaction of state court decrees which determine or characterize an
individual's property rights with subsequent federal court litigation
which imposes the federal tax burden upon those rights. While
Congress determines what relationships are to be taxed, state law
creates and state court adjudications measure these relationships.' In
1934 the Supreme Court formulated the standard that the state court
decision was to be followed by a federal tax court in the absence of
collusion, since the decree established the state "law" in regard to
the relevant property.2 However, the definitional and conceptual
problems encountered by the various circuit courts led to a m6lange of
interpretations and an inconsistent application of the Supreme Court
test. The ensuing diversity in the circuits was resolved in June of
1967 with the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch.3 Holding that a state trial court adjudication of property
rights is not binding upon subsequent tax litigation in a federal court
and that the federal court is free to conduct an independent inquiry
into the state "law" in the absence of a statement by the state's
highest court, the Court discarded the old "binding unless collusive"
test and established a more restrictive standard. The purpose of this
note is to examine the decision and its context and to evaluate the
analytical and practical consequences of the new rule.
II. BACKGROUND
- A. Conceptual Context
The touchstone for the primacy of state court judgments in federal
tax litigation is the principle that federal tax consequences are de-
pendent upon rights established under state law.4  State law is
determinative of the nature and scope of the individual's property
rights, and Congress imposes the tax burden upon these established
rights.6 The relevant problem thus becomes: what is the applicable
1. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940); Calm, Local Law in Federal
Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799 (1943).
2. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
3. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
4. Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598 (1916).
5. "State law creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate




state law pertaining to the issue in question? Basically, there are
two distinct methods of proving state law.
6
The first method involves a reliance on the "general" state law,
that is, state statutes or precedential state court decisions to which
the taxpayer was not a party. The methodology of this approach is
to establish the general rule of law for a state and to reflect the
probable action that the highest court of that state would take on
the issue.7 The "burden of legal persuasion" is upon the proponent
to show effectively that the proposed rule comports with the general
law of the state.8 Applying the Erie principle of the diversity cases,
it would appear that the "general law of the state" is the law enun-
ciated by the legislature or by decision of the highest state court;
that the rule of law announced by the intermediate state court is
not to be disregarded by a federal court unless convinced that the
highest court would hold otherwise; and that in the absence of an
authoritative declaration of state law, the federal court should employ
all available data to determine the probable disposition of the issue
by the state's highest court.9
The second method of proving the applicable state law is to
refer to the preceding state court disposition of the case in which
the taxpayer's property rights were adjudicated or property interests
characterized. Accordingly, this second method of proof is distin-
guishable from the first, since reference is made to a specific state
court decree which established the property rights or interests of the
taxpayer. "WVhere there is such a decision and it meets all the re-
quirements for acceptance it ordinarily precludes reference to the
general law of the state."10 The policies which underlie the use of
the particular state court decree in which the taxpayer's property
rights were determined as proof of state law may be summarized as
6. See generally 1 MEaTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL GxFT & ESTATE TAXATION § 10.03,
at 604 (1959).
7. Id.
8. See Marguerite T. Payne, 1 T.C. 360, 364 (1942), where the Tax Court said:
"[T]he lack of any authority, statutory or judicial, justifying the conclusion that
under state law the income in question belonged to the husband, utterly precludes
the successful prosecution of petitioner's claim here. . . . Thus, the burden of legal
persuasion to satisfy us that the state law would so operate as to confer upon the
husband the necessary community rights has not been met. The absence of any
such showing requires that the issue be determined in respondent's favor."
9. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. 1 MimTENs, supra note 6, at 625. Mr. Mertens says that three basic require-
ments must be satisfied for the adjudication to be "acceptable": (1) the state court
must have had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter; (2) the decree must
have been conclusive as to the parties; (3) the adjudications must have "passed upon"
the merits of the precise issue before the tax court. If these three are not satisfied,
then proof of the general state law is required. See Id. § 10.10, at 630.
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follows: (1) Since federal tax consequences are imposed by
Congress upon the property rights established and determined by
state law, state, rather than federal, standards should be employed for
the resolution of federal tax law issues in regard to these property
rights. Thus, the acceptance of the state court decree is consistent
with the Congressional purpose of deferring to the state's definition
of the taxpayer's property rights. (2) In accordance with the Erie
policy of uniformity in the administration of law within each state,
the taxpayer's property rights should not be viewed dissimilarly by
the state and federal governments. For example, it is inequitable to
determine that an individual is to be regarded as the owner of certain
property for federal tax purposes when, under a state court decree,
he has no right to or interest in the property. This policy is reflected
in the Supreme Court pronouncement that:
The right to succeed to the property of the decedent depends upon and
is regulated by state law ... and it is obvious that a judicial construction
of the will by a state court with competent jurisdiction determines not only
legally but practically the extent and character of the interests taken by the
legatees.1
(3) Since the state courts are more familiar with the operation,
direction, and eccentricities of their law, they are in a better position
to apply it accurately.'
2
Weighed against these three policy considerations is the federal
interest in protecting the treasury from the vicissitudes of collusive
state suits and inaccurate state court decrees. The interest in defend-
ing against the "hazards to the federal fise from dubious decisions
of lower state courts" 13 necessitates a concern with the accuracy and
trustworthiness of the state court decision and requires that the
federal court set certain standards which will serve to evaluate the
quality of the state court judgment.
B. Prior Supreme Court Cases
In 1934 the Supreme Court first articulated the test for evaluating
and ensuring the required quality of the state court determination
before it was to become binding in subsequent federal tax litigation.
The Court, in Freuler v. Helvering,14 held that a California decree on
a trustees account, which determined that the life beneficiaries were
11. Uterhart v. United States, 240 U.S. 598, 605 (1916) (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Justice Harlan's dissent, joined by Justice Fortas, in Commissioner v.
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
13. Id. at 479.
14. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
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to repay an excess distribution resulting from the trustee's failure to
establish a depreciation reserve, was binding for federal income tax
purposes. In so holding, the Court formulated the rule that a state
court decision determining the property rights of the taxpayer is
binding upon subsequent federal tax litigation, in the absence of
collusion. The Commissioner had contended that the state proceeding
was "collusive in that all parties had joined in a submission of the
issues and sought a decision which would adversely affect the
Government's right to additional income tax."'15 The Court rejected
this contention, disagreeing because: the case was initiated in the
state court in the usual manner; notice was given to the interested
parties; objections were presented; all parties were represented by
counsel; the decree purported to decide issues regularly submitted;
the decree was not a consent decree; and the state court ruled for
the proponents on one point and against them on another. Although
noting that the California court judgment could not serve as a basis
for res judicata (because the Commissioner was not a party) nor as
a basis for full faith and credit, the Court stated that "the decision of
[the state court], until reversed or overruled, established the law of
California respecting distribution of the trust estate. It is none the
less a declaration of the law of the State because not based on . . .
earlier decisions." 16
The fundamentals of the Freuler decision were reaffirmed three
years later in Blair v. Commissioner,17 where the relevant tax issue
presented was whether a testamentary trust was a spendthrift trust
barring the voluntary alienation of the beneficiary's interests. The
Court held that a decision by an Illinois intermediate appellate court
upholding the life beneficiary's right to assign portions of his interest
was conclusive of the validity of the assignments in subsequent federal
tax litigation. Noting that the state suit was not collusive, the Court
placed crucial reliance on the fact that the Illinois court reviewed
the decisions of the state's highest court and reached a "deliberate
conclusion." "To derogate from the authority of that conclusion and
of the decree it commanded, so far as the question is one of state
law, would be wholly unwarranted in the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion."16
15. Id. at 45.
16. Id. In the Freuler case, Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone,
dissented on the basis that the effect of the state, court adjudication was not to
diminish the taxable income of the life beneficiaries to the extent which the majority
seemed to indicate.
17. 300 U.S. 5 (1937). The suit in the Illinois state courts was brought by the
trustee for instructions. The adversarial interest was represented by the life beneficiary
and his assignees.
18. Id. at 10.
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C. Responses by the Circuit Courts of Appeal
1. The Split Over "Collusion."-In response to the broad standard
promulgated in Freuler and Blair, the courts of appeal of the various
circuits split dramatically as to the interpretation and application of
the rule. Central to the divisive interpretations was the problem of
defining and delimiting the term "collusion."
At one end of the spectrum was the Gallagher19 rule utilized by the
Third Circuit. Reflecting a rather strict application of the Supreme
Court standard, the court equated collusion with actual fraud and
held that a nonadversary proceeding in the Pennsylvania Orphan's
Court was conclusive in subsequent tax litigation as to the taxpayer's
interest in a trust estate. Noting that the adversary positions in
Blair were merely formal, the court rejected the argument that the
state proceeding should be deemed collusive if it was not adversary
in character20 and stated:
[Ilf the question at issue is fairly presented to the state court for its inde-
pendent decision and is so decided by the court the resulting judgment if
binding upon the parties under the state law is conclusive as to their prop-
erty rights in the federal tax case, regardless of whether they occupied
adversary positions in the state court or were all on the same side of the
question.
21
Under the Gallagher approach, the nonadversary character of the
state proceeding "is relevant in so far as it is evidence of collusion."m
The ramifications of the Gallagher rule can be seen more distinctly
in the Third Circuit decision of Estate of Darlington v. Commis-
sioner.23 In that case the Tax Court made the factual determination
19. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
20. "If the question is fairly posed to the court and the tribunal is left free to
decide it according to its own judgment it should not be necessary for the parties
to take adversarial positions and engage in legal shadow boxing in order that the
judgment of the court should have conclusive effect, tax-wise as well as property-
wise." Id. at 225. The court noted that the lower court (7th Cir.) in Blair had
stated that all the parties had the common goal of avoiding the burden of federal
taxation and that they merely appealed until they received a favorable decision and
then ceased appeals. Id. at 225. The majority opinion reasoned that their refusal to
equate "collusion" with "nonadversary" was supported by the strong public policy
favoring family harmony, because it is commonplace for members of a family group
to take a common view as to the rights under a will. However, the dissent in
Gallagher argued that the Orphan's Court did not purport to adjudicate property
rights, but merely followed its practice of refusing to disturb distributions to which
all parties in interest had assented.
21. Id. at 225. Thus, under the Gallagher decision, the test is: "whether the judg-
ment is an adjudication upon which solely the federal tax is imposed, which adjudi-
cation was and is final and binding upon the parties under the state law, and which
was not obtained by collusion for the purpose of defeating the tax." Id. at 226.
22. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
23. 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962).
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that the state court action was nonadversary in character and that
the state court proceeding was instituted for the sole purpose of
establishing a basis for an estate tax deduction. On appeal to the
Third Circuit, the Commissioner asserted, as he did in Blair, that
collusion should be found when all parties join in the submission of
the issues and jointly seek a decision which would adversely affect
the Government's right to additional tax. However, the court disre-
garded this contention and held that the state court proceeding was
determinative of the relevant property rights and binding upon the
subsequent federal tax action.
At the opposite end of the spectrum was the Fifth Circuit position,
as espoused in Saulsbury v. United States.24 There the court held that
the decision of an Indiana probate court was obtained by collusion,
because all parties were in accord as to the proposed decision in the
state court, and the probate court did not reach the merits of the
true issue as to the beneficiary's property rights.P In defining the
term "collusion" the court adopted a liberal interpretation of the
Supreme Court standard and stated:
By the word collusion, we do not mean to imply fraudulent or improper
conduct, but simply that all interested parties agreed to the order and that
it was apparently to their advantage from a tax standpoint to do so. We
mean that there was no genuine issue of law or fact as to the right of the
beneficiary to receive this income, and no bona fide controversy between the
trustee and the beneficiary as to property rights under the trust instrument.26
Between the two extremes of Gallagher and Saulsbury were variants
of both these rules, including interpretations which provided a more
moderate approach to the problem. The Eighth Circuit's position was
expressed in Peyton's Estate v. Commissionerz7 where the court held
that since the state proceeding was collusive, a Minnesota probate
court decree was not binding on the federal tax question of whether
the widow had a terminable interest. A sufficient basis for the holding
of collusion was found in the following factors: the estate's counsel
represented the widow; the counsel received the probate court's prior
24. 199 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
25. The court held that where the terms of the trust instrument provided that the
life beneficiary was to receive trust income for life and the estate taxes on the settlor's
estate were to be paid from corpus, even though the trustee had obtained an order
from the Indiana probate court directing him to apply all the income to repayment
of money borrowed to pay estate taxes, the trust income was taxable to the life
beneficiary for income tax purposes, because the beneficiary did not contest the state
court action and the issue of whether the beneficiary was entitled to the income
was not raised in the state court.
26. Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, at 580 (5th Cir. 1952). The burden
of proof as to collusion was apparently placed on the taxpayer.
27. 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
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assurance as to the interpretation of the will; notice was given to
relatives, but they made no appearance; no notice was given to the
Commissioner; and there was no opposition to the advocated decree.
However, the court was careful to note that the mere fact that the
state suit was nonadversary does not, per se, render the proceeding
collusive. Citing Gallagher, the court determined that the nonadver-
sary character was evidence of collusion. As to the elements of
collusion, the court stated that while actual fraud is the most obvious
example, the definition relevant to tax cases is not so narrow; collusion
is to be defined in terms of all parties joining to affect adversely the
government's right to taxes.2
The Seventh Circuit position, which gravitated more toward Sauls-
bury, can be seen in a series of cases beginning with Brainard v.
Commissioner9 and culminating in Faulkerson's Estate v. United
States.3° In Brainard the court refused to give binding effect to a
decision of the Cook County (Illinois) Circuit Court, ostensibly on
the basis of the limited geographical jurisdiction of that tribunal. The
court noted that there were some 100 circuit courts in Illinois and
that their decisions provided diverse interpretations of the state law;
the correct statement of state law was to be found in the Illinois
appellate or Supreme Court decisions.31 In Merchants National Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States32 the Seventh Circuit refused to be
bound by a consent decree issued by a state probate court. And
finally, in Faulkerson's Estate the Seventh Circuit held that an Indiana
circuit court decree was not binding on the federal tax determination
of whether a widow was entitled to take the marital deduction, since
the state decree was entered in an ex parte proceeding without notice
to interested persons, without appearances, and without a hearing on
the merits. Here, as in Brainard, the court referred to the limited
jurisdiction of the state court33 and the fact that the Commissioner,
not a party to the state proceeding, had no right to appeal. The court
formulated its definition of collusion in terms of the Commissioner's
long-established position: "[C]ollusive in the sense that a decision
was sought which would adversely affect the Government's right to
additional estate tax."' 4 In a significant dictum, the court delineated
28. The Peyton court quoted this definition from Saulsbury.
29. 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937).
30. 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962).
31. Note that all the parties to the state proceeding were satisfied with the state
decree and did not appeal, and furthermore, the Commissioner was not made a party,
thus having no right to appeal.
32. 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1957).
33. There are eighty-four circuit courts in Indiana.
34. Faulkerson's Estate v. United States, 301 F.2d 231, at 232 (7th Cir. 1962).
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the "proper case" in which it would accept the state decree as
determinative:
[Wihere the state court proceeding was adversary and not ex parte; where
a hearing was had on the merits; where the question of law has been
settled by the appellate courts of the state or where the judgment of an
intermediate may be fairly accepted as evidencing the law of the state;
and where the judgment is not collusive.m
These requirements, taken conjunctively, would appear to necessitate
that there be an adversary contest and that the proceeding not be
collusive in the sense that the proceeding was instituted in order to
obtain favorable tax treatment. This intimates that even where the
state court suit is opposed by an interested party, the decree may be
inconclusive in subsequent federal tax litigation if the purpose of the
state proceeding was to defeat the federal tax.3
6
An approach which is consistent with the Brainard and Faulkerson
cases, but which was based upon the conceptual principles of the
Erie doctrine,37 was taken by the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. In
Pierpont v. Commissioner38 the Fourth Circuit held that a state court
decree that a widow possessed the requisite power of appointment to
qualify the testator's estate for the marital deduction was not bind-
ing upon the federal court, because the state decision was rendered
by a nisi prius court in a nonadversary proceeding in which the state
court did not make an independent inquiry into the state law. The
court declared that under Erie, "state law" is determined by the
appellate courts, and the decisions of nisi prius courts are not required
to be followed as binding precedents; thus the state court decree was
not an authoritative statement of "state law."39 Similarly, in Old Kent
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States4" the Sixth Circuit held that the
Rules of Decision Act does not require that a federal tax court be
bound by the construction of a will by a Michigan probate court.
The court noted the limited jurisdiction of the Michigan probate court
to construe and interpret wills4' and stated that the opinions of the
35. Id. at 233.
36. See Sacks, The Binding Effeci of Nontax Litigation in State Courts, N.Y.U.
21ST INST. ON FED. TAx 295 (1963).
37. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
39. Blair was distinguished on two grounds: the appellate court in Blair reviewed
the state supreme court decisions and reached a deliberate conclusion; the appellate
court decision in Blair had the effect of stare decisis.
40. 362 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1966) (order of Michigan probate court, construing
will, not binding and conclusive on federal tax court in determining the amount of
the marital deduction under the federal estate tax) (the court expressly declined to
follow Gallagher).
41. This jurisdiction is generally vested in the Michigan circuit courts.
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probate court are not published, digested, or made available to the
profession, and they do not constitute binding precedents in other
Michigan courts.
2. Elements of an "Adversary Contest."-Although the circuit courts
of appeal were dramatically split as to whether nonadverseness was
determinative or merely evidence of collusion, the presence or absence
of this factor had an apparent effect upon the cases. Yet, the precise
definition and scope of "adversary" was never reduced to a single,
functional formula. Rather, it must be comprehended from an exami-
nation of the courts' considerations of the various indicia of adverse-
ness. Obviously, a primary element is that in the state proceeding
there must be some party, given notice or appearing, who represents
a countervailing interest. It has been stated that "[lIegal adverseness
. . . can be proven by a showing of economic adverseness."4 The
courts have generally applied this definition literally, and an economic
adverseness is not vitiated merely because the opposing economic
interests are represented within the same family unit.
43
It has been clearly determined that the Commissioner does not
have to be one of the adverse parties, nor does his position have
to be asserted in the state court.4 As a matter of strategic preference,
the Commissioner has abstained from litigating federal tax liability
in state courts,45 and when he is made a party defendant, the estab-
lished practice of the government is to appear specially and to move
the dismissal of the action as it relates to the Commissioner. Never-
theless, the taxpayer has received significant benefits by giving notice
to the Commissioner and apprising him of the state proceeding. 46
In one instance, the taxpayer prevailed in the federal tax litigation
primarily because the New York state tax commissioner entered the
42. Sacks, supra note 36. 1
43. See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) and Freuler v. I-elvering,
291 U.S. 35 (1934), where close relationship of the adversaries did not deter the
binding effect of the state decree. But see Charles S. McVeigh, 4 T.C. 1291 (1944).
44. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35
(1934); Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955). Granting conclusive effect
to a state decree in which the Commissioner's argument was not presented has been
challenged in: Note, Effect of State Court Decrees in Federal Tax Litigation: A
Proposal for Judicial Reform, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 581 (1963): "If a taxpayer,
intending to avoid tax liability, institutes a state suit, and if no interested party
presents the argument urged by the Commissioner, then the state court judgment
should be considered to have been collusively obtained." (Emphasis added.)
45. See Mem. 6134, April 3, 1947, CCH 1947 FxD. TAx RPe. I[ 6137: "It is neither
the policy nor practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to participate in litigation
in state courts between private litigants even though the purpose of the parties is to
obtain a decree or judgment affecting Federal tax liability of one . . . of the parties
to the litigation."
46. Sacks, supra note 36.
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state litigation and argued that the trust did not qualify for the New
York marital deduction (similar to IRC section 2056) .4 Of course,
if the Commissioner were to appear generally and litigate his position
in the state suit, the state decree would be binding in subsequent
federal tax litigation as res judicata.
Another factor giving rise to an inference of adverseness is appeal
of the state court decision. "The mere fact that the state court de-
termination was affirmed on appeal seems determinative of the issue."48
The touchstone of this doctrine is found in Kelly's Trust v. Commis-
sioner,49 where the Second Circuit upheld the binding effect of the
state court decree on the basis of the appeal: "Whatever may have
been the nature of the state-court suit in its inception, the appeal
made it adversary."50 The affirmative significance of this factor is
seen in the Tax Court's consistent adherence to the Kelly rule.51
The courts have also regarded more subtle factors than the pres-
ence of an adverse party or an appeal as indicative of the adversary
character of the state suit. For example, negative implications have
been drawn where the state proceeding appears perfunctory, that is,
where there is an absence of counsel, pleadings, argument, or briefs.52
In addition, the taxpayer's case has been considered as weakened
where there has been a relatively short period of time between the
filing in the state court and the issuance of the state decree.53 Declara-
tory judgments have occasionally been denied binding effect,54 but
this has been criticized as specious reasoning where the state suit
meets all other requirements of adverseness.55
III. Bosch AND Tm Nmw STANDARD
In an attempt to resolve the disparities in the application of the
Freuler rule by the various circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in two cases from separate panels of the Second Circuit,
47. Estate of Dake v. United States, CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (61-2 U.S.
Tax Cas.) ff 12,033 (W.D.N.Y. July 31, 1961).
48. Sacks, supra note 36.
49. 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948).
50. Id. at 198-99.
51. See, e.g., Estate of Beechy, 15 T.C. 136 (1950); Commissioner v. Thomas
Flexible Coupling Co., 14 T.C. 802 (1950), aff'd 198 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1952).
52. Sacks, supra note 36.
53. Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1956); Estate of
Elson, 28 T.C. 442 (1957).
54. See, e.g., Loggie v. Thomas, 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945).
55. See, Sacks, supra note 36, and his reference to Commissioner v. Thomas Flexible
Coupling Co., 14 T.C. 802 (1950); Consumer-Farmer Milk Co-operative, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 186 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1950).
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In 1930 Herman Bosch established a revocable inter vivos trust
providing that his wife receive the trust income for life and giving
her, in the event she survived him, a general testamentary power of
appointment over the corpus. 58 In 1951, Mrs. Bosch executed an
instrument purporting to convert the general power into a special
power of appointment. Herman Bosch died in 1957, and his executor
claimed the value of the widow's trust as a marital deduction under
section 2056(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code.59 The Commis-
sioner denied the deduction and assessed a deficiency on the basis
that the conversion of the general power into a special power dis-
qualified the trust corpus from the marital deduction.
While the executor's petition for redetermination was pending in
the Tax Court, an action was brought in a New York Supreme Court
for a determination under state law of the validity of the 1951 re-
lease. The state court issued an order to show cause upon Mrs. Bosch
and twenty-three potential beneficiaries,
60 and three briefs were filed,61
all contending that the release was a nullity. The New York court
held that Mrs. Bosch could not release the power until she survived
her husband, and that since her husband was still alive at the time
the purported release was executed, the release instrument was in-
effective.62
In the subsequent proceedings, the Tax Court accepted the New
York decision as "an authoritative exposition of New York law and
56. 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
57. 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965).
58. This provision was inserted by an amendment to the trust instrument in 1931.
59. Under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2056(a) and 2056(b)(5), the decedents
estate is allowed to deduct from the gross estate the value of interests in property
passing to the surviving spouse. If the interest is in trust, then the spouse must be
entitled to the income for life and must have a general power of appointment, i.e., the
power to appoint to herself, her estate, or both.
60. These potential beneficiaries would take under the trust instrument if Mrs. Bosch
failed to effect an appointment. Under the trust instrument, in event of default of
appointment, the trust corpus was to be split evenly between the next of kin of Mr.
and Mrs. Bosch.
61. The briefs were filed by counsel for the trustee, Mrs. Bosch, and the guardian
ad litem of a minor who would be a potential beneficiary in event of default of appoint-
ment. The other twenty-two potential beneficiaries failed to appear.
62. "It seems clear that the donee of a power of appointment cannot exercise it
prior to its creation. . . .A power of appointment created under a revocable deed of
trust, which power shall be exercised by will, may not be exercised while the settlor
of the trust is still alive." In re Bosch, N.Y.L.J., (Sup. Ct., Nov. 15, 1963) as cited
in Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 122 (1964).
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adjudication of the property rights involved,"6 3 and consequently
overturned the Commissioner's assessment of the deficiency. The Tax
Court relied on five basic factors in reaching its conclusion: (1) The
state court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and its judg-
ment was final and conclusive as to the parties. (2) Although the New
York Supreme Court is a trial court, its decisions have precedential
value throughout the state.64 (3) The Commissioner was notified of
the state proceeding, and he could have entered the contest. (4) The
state court rendered a reasoned opinion and reached a deliberate
conclusion. (5) The state decree provided more than a label for
past events; it determined the nature of the power of appointment
with potentially adverse tax consequences at a future date (when
Mrs. Bosch exercises the power). 65
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax
Court.66 The court characterized the issue as whether the federal
court should "accept" the state court decision, rather than whether
the federal court was "bound" by the state decision, and relied upon
basically the same factors cited by the Tax Court in holding that the
state court decision settled the rights of the parties for purposes of
the application of the federal tax law. In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Friendly rejected the "mechanicar' approach of the majority and pro-
posed the following test: when the state court action is brought pri-
marily to affect federal taxes, the judgment of an inferior state court
should be accorded little weight; when the state court has not re-
ceived a fair presentation of both sides of the controversy, the decree
is entitled to no weight. Since he was convinced that the New York
proceeding was obviously instituted for tax purposes 7 and the state
court was so busy that it "erroneously ratified the parties' unanimous
contention, "6  he argued that the Tax Court's decision should have
been reversed.
B. Second National Bank v. United States
In 1958 the testator died, leaving a will and codicil which provided
that the residue of the estate was to be left in trust: one-third for
63. Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964).
64. The Tax Court distinguished Brainard and Faulkerson on the grounds that they
involved courts of limited geographical jurisdiction whose decisions are not binding
as precedents on other state courts.
65. If Mrs. Bosch exercises the power, then the trust corpus will be subject to
taxation in her estate. However, as the dissent in the court of appeals decision noted,
if she does not exercise the power, then Mr. 'Bosch's estate is allowed the marital
deduction, but it is not taxed in her estate.
66. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1966).
67. Judge Friendly declared that this was obviously a case in which all parties joined
in seeking to affect adversely the government's right to taxes.
68. 363 F.2d at 1018.
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the benefit of his widow and two-thirds for the benefit of certain
grandchildren. In addition, the testator directed that any statute which
required proration of death taxes among his beneficiaries should have
no effect. The executor applied the Connecticut proration statute,6 9
which provides that a bequest to a widow which qualifies for the
marital deduction is not to be reduced by federal estate taxes, and
computed the marital deduction on the basis of the widow's share
of the residue before estate taxes were taken into consideration. The
Commissioner assessed a deficiency on the ground that the widow's
share should be reduced by the proportionate amount of the estate
tax attributable to that share. Subsequent to the Commissioner's as-
sessment, the executor petitioned a Connecticut probate court for a
determination of the proration of the federal estate tax. The guardian
ad litem of the grandchildren entered an appearance in support of
the executor's petition, and the probate court applied the proration
statute on the basis that the testator's directive was ambiguous.
Within a year of the decision of the probate court, the executor
brought an action in the federal district court for a refund of the
deficiency assessment. The district court noted that the Connecticut
probate court was not a court of record and that most of the judges
were laymen, and accordingly held that "under no circumstances can
[their decrees] be construed as binding and conclusive upon a federal
court in construing and applying the federal revenue laws."70 How-
ever, upon an independent examination of the facts of the case and
state law, the district court concluded that the proration statute ap-
plied.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court decision
on the basis that "the testator specifically wished to have death taxes
paid... without proration."71 As to the weight to be accorded to the
Connecticut probate court decree, the court agreed with the district
court that such decisions are never binding upon subsequent federal
tax litigation, noting that the probate court decisions are not binding
on the state's higher courts and are even subject to collateral attack in
another probate district. Consequently, the court concluded that it
was unnecessary to determine whether the state court proceedings
were collusive or nonadversary.
C. The Supreme Court Disposition
After tracing the diverse approaches taken by the circuit courts in
applying the Freuler standard, the Supreme Court concluded: "We
69. CoNN. GEm. STAT. RE v. § 12-401(a) (1964).
70. Second Nat'1 Bank v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 446, 457 (D. Conn. 1963).
71. Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 1965).
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look at the problem differently."72 First, since the Commissioner was
not made a party in either of the state proceedings, the principles of
res judicata and collateral estoppel were not considered relevant. In
determining the weight to be accorded the decree of a state trial
court, the Court looked to the legislative history of the marital deduc-
tion statute and concluded that the state court interpretations of the
will are only entitled to "proper regard" rather than "finality" and
then only when resulting from "a bona fide adversary proceeding."7 3
Moreover, the Court viewed the strict limitations which Congress
placed on the marital deduction as indicating a meticulous concern
with eliminating loopholes. From this legislative context the Court
inferred that Congress did not intend to make the decrees of state
trial courts binding or conclusive upon a federal court in estate tax
cases. This was deemed to be consistent with the principles of Erie
and the congressional policy behind the Rules of Decision Act.74 In
diversity cases a lower state court adjudication is attributed some
weight, but it is not controlling; an intermediate appellate state court
decision is a datum for determining state law, which a federal court
should not disregard unless convinced that the highest state court
would hold otherwise. 5 Though recognizing that a federal tax case
differs from a diversity case, the Court determined that the Erie
principle applies for the same reasons, that is, the "substantive rule
involved is based on state law and the State's highest court is the best
authority for its own law."76 In the absence of a decision by the state's
highest court, the federal tax court must make an independent exami-
nation of state law, giving "proper regard" to lower state court rulings.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision below in Second National
and remanded Bosch for a determination of the applicable "state law."
. In the first of three dissenting opinions, Justice Douglas criticized
as a misinterpretation" the majority's reliance on the Erie principle.
72. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463 (1967).
73. Id. at 464. The Court found this illumination in S. REP. No. 1013, Pt. 2, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (in the absence of federal requirements, such as the Constitu-
tion or federal statutes, state law, when applicable, is to be regarded as a rule of
decision in federal court civil actions).
75. As authority for this proposition the Court cited, among others, the following
cases: King v. Order of Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948); West v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
76. 387 U.S. at 465.
77. See 387 U.S. at 466: "[W]e have never suggested that the federal court may
ignore a relevant state court decision because it was not entered by the highest state
court. Indeed, we have held that the 'federal court is obligated to follow the decisions
of a lower state court in the abseiice of decisions of the State Supreme Court showing
that the state law is other than announced by the lower court."
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Moreover, he noted that refusal of the federal court to give effect to
the state court decree may result in unfairness to taxpayers; they may
be taxed for benefits which they do not have under state law, a
position contrary to the congressional policy of making federal tax
consequences dependent upon rights established under state law.
Basing his position on Freuler and Blair, Justice Douglas contended
that, absent fraud or collusion, a federal court should not ignore the
state court judgment.7
8
Justice Harlan's dissent, with Justice Fortas joining, rejected the
Douglas approach as too risky and the majority approach as requiring
far more federal intervention than necessary to protect the federal
interest. Although admitting that Erie and the Rules of Decision Act
were applicable, he asserted that these authorities do not compel any
single conclusion. Furthermore, he found no rational basis for the
automatic application of the diversity formula in all cases where the
federal courts were to ascertain the state law. "The relationship be-
tween the state and federal judicial systems is simply too delicate
and important to be reduced to any single standard."79 As an alter-
native solution, Justice Harlan proposed that the problem be ap-
proached by balancing the state and federal interests. He viewed the
state interests here to be: uniformity of the administration of law
within each state; proper regard by federal courts for these areas of law
left to the states by the Constitution; and, the '"etter position" of
the state courts to assess their own laws. The federal interest in-
volved was expressed as the danger to the federal treasury and to
the administration of the federal tax law presented by inaccurate state
court decisions which favor the taxpayer. This federal interest, said
Justice Harlan, is satisfied if the state court renders a considered
judgment. Therefore, he would have held that a federal court must
accept any state court decision that bears the indicia of a genuinely
adversary contest.
80
In his own separate dissent, Justice Fortas agreed with the ap-
proach taken by Justice Harlan but argued that the "adversity" test
was not entirely sufficient. Rather, he would have relied upon a
broader scope of factors, and he listed those indices cited by Judge
Raum in the Tax Court decision of Bosch.81
78. Justice Douglas posed two examples where the state court decree should not be
given effect: where the judgment is by consent decree and where fraud or collusion are
present. 387 U.S. at 471.
79. 387 U.S. at 477.
80. In determining adverseness between the parties, Justice Harlan would look to the
"actual adversity of their financial and other interests."
81. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
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IV. CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS
In response to the diversity in the circuit courts' interpretations of
the Freuler rule, the Supreme Court has discarded effectively the old
"binding unless collusive" standard and has substituted a more me-
chanical test based upon the Erie principle. The new rule is: state
trial court decisions are to be accorded only a "proper regard"; an
intermediate court decision is controlling unless the federal court is
convinced that the state's highest court would hold otherwise; and
the decision by the state's highest court is binding upon subsequent
tax litigation. Under this new approach the Court has effectively elimi-
nated the method of proof of the state law which was based upon
the decision of a state court proceeding in which the specific tax-
payer's property rights were adjudicated. Now, the only method of
proof is by reference to the general law of the state, that is, the
probable action the state's highest court would take in a similarsituationPa
Since the diverse interpretations had demonstrated that the "col-
lusion" test had lost its efficacy, the Court was wise in abandoning
it. However, the analytical precision of the new rule may be seriously
questioned. Indeed, the intrusion of the Erie principle into the state
court-federal tax court context appears totally inapposite and artificial.
The Erie doctrine was fashioned as a means of ascertaining the gen-
eral law of the state in order to apply that law to a case which
originated in the federal court system. The situation in the Bosch
context is significantly different: the federal tax court considers the
same facts and issues presented in the state court proceeding involv-
ing the taxpayer, and the federal court also confronts a state decree
which has determined the property rights of the taxpayer and has
practical consequences aside from the tax question. Thus, the federal
court is presented not just with the law of the state as an abstraction;
the state law has been legally and practically translated into an appli-
cation to this particular taxpayer. To refuse to accept this translation
and application of state law by the state court is to violate the basic
premise that the federal tax consequeices are to be imposed upon
property rights created and determined by state law. Yet, under the
new approach it is quite possible for there to be a variance between
the rights and interests held by the taxpayer under a state court
decree (which is the effective state law relevant to his interests) and
the tax imposed upon those interests as determined by a federal court.
It is conceivable that an individual could be taxed on certain prop-
erty rights which, according to a reasoned opinion rendered by a
82. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
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state court in a truly adversary proceeding, he does not possess.
Since all the federal interest requires is an accurate and trustworthy
state court decision, to allow a federal court to make an independent
inquiry into state law may result in a gross unfairness to taxpayers
without any concommitant promotion -of the federal interest.
Hopefully, these potential adverse consequences of the new stan-
dard can be avoided by utilization of the Court's directive to give
"proper regard" to state trial court determinations. The meaning of
"proper regard" was not thoroughly delineated by the Court, and
unfortunately its interpretation will be a problem for the circuit
courts. But, there is a strong probability that the state trial court's
judgment will be given varying weight, ranging from the full weight
of precedent to no weight at all, depending upon the quality and
characteristics of the state court proceeding. Yet, evaluating the
quality of the state court action will undoubtedly lead the circuits
back to the collusive-adversary syndrome experienced in the wake
of Freuler and Blair. To achieve a more precise and a more uniform
treatment of the problem, it would be well for the courts to refrain
from the use of the vague term "collusive." This term is at best
ambiguous, and its various nuances and connotations have led to
a welter of diverse interpretations. Thus, a new approach is needed
for evaluating the proper regard to be accorded state trial court
decisions.
A more proper approach would lie in identifying the various
interests of the federal government, the states, and the taxpayers
and then fashioning a set of standards to reconcile effectively any
competition among these interests. Assuming the basic premise that
the federal taxing statutes apply to property rights created and de-
termined by state law, the fundamental inquiry must be directed
toward ascertaining the state law in regard to the taxpayer's prop-
erty rights. Since the state trial court has determined, both legally
and practically, the taxpayer's rights under state law, this determi-
nation would stand as long as it met certain criteria designed to assess
the quality of the judgment. These criteria should be fashioned so
as to promote state and taxpayer interests in having property
rights treated consistently by the state and federal governments and
to promote the federal interest in safeguarding the treasury from in-
accurate and untrustworthy state court decisions favorable to the
taxpayer. Both these interests are served if the federal court accepts
a state court decision which has been reached after a full hearing
on the merits and adequate deliberation by the court. Accordingly,
the standard should be whether the state trial court rendered a
reasoned decision after an adequate opportunity to consider all aspects
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of the issue.
To insure that this standard is met, the courts should employ
certain guidelines which serve to indicate the degree of accuracy of
the state court decree. Chief among the guidelines would be the
presence or absence of an actual adverseness of economic interests.0 3
Perhaps under the new Supreme Court standard there must be a
demonstration of adverseness; however, this has not been clearly es-
tablished.8 4 Certainly, affimative implications may be drawn from
the fact that adverse parties were given notice, appeared, and made
objections to the proposed rulings, for this would indicate that the
court was presented with the different views of the issue and that it
had a sufficient basis for rendering a reasoned decision. Although
negative implications should be drawn from the absence of adverse
parties, this should not preclude the federal court's acceptance of the
state court decree. There are situations in which the court could
reach a decision after a full analysis of the issue, even though all
parties support the proposed ruling. "Where there is a full hearing
on the merits, even though all the parties are on the same side of
the question, it is difficult to bar acceptance on some generalized
definition of collusion which automatically excludes nonadversary
adjudications."85 And, where the parties adopt a unanimous position,
the Bosch requirement that the decision be appealed until the state's
highest court has ruled on the case would indeed be most difficult to
meet. However, it is human nature and the tendency of many pro-
bate courts to readily accede to a proposed holding where all the
interested parties are in agreement. Therefore, where there is no
actual adversity, the burden of proof should shift to the taxpayer, and
he should be compelled to persuade the court that the state court
made a discerning analysis of the issue after a consideration of the
opposite view.
In addition, the state court decree should have substantial practical
consequences to the interested parties apart from the consequences
of federal tax liability.8 If the adjudication amounts to no more than
a labelling of the parties' existing interests in the property and serves
to affect adversely the government's right to taxes, then the decision
83. Economic adverseness is shown when the decision favorable to one party would
adversely affect another party's financial interests in the property in question.
84. It is not clear whether the Supreme Court intended the directive gleaned from
the legislative history of the marital deduction ("proper regard" shall be given state
trial court determinations, and then only when rendered in an adversary proceeding)
to be the standard, or whether the rule presented by the Erie principle ("some weight"
shall be attributed to the state trial court decisions) should prevail.
85. 1 MERTENS, LAw OF FDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 10.15 at 648-49
(1959).
-86. Cf. Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 123 (1964).
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should not be accepted.87 Similarly, if there is no bona fide contro-
versy as to the property rights of the parties involved, the state decree
should not be accepted. If the single purpose of the state suit is to
defeat the federal tax, and the state decision only affects the federal
tax liability, then it should not be regarded as conclusive.
No state court decision should be accepted in which the Commis-
sioner was not notified of the proceeding; or if the state proceeding
was initiated before the tax question could have been reasonably fore-
seen, the decree should not be accepted unless the Commissioner's
position was asserted by a party to the state suit. Although this re-
quirement does not directly relate to the basic standard, it is neces-
sary to insure that a decision will not be asserted against the Com-
missioner when he has had no opportunity to present his position.
If all these requirements are fulfilled, the federal court could then
entertain a contention by the Commissioner that the state court de-
cision is in clear conflict with the established law of the state. This
of course would be another factor indicating the inaccuracy and un-
trustworthiness of the state decree. However, the burden of proof
would be upon the Commissioner to show conclusively that the es-
tablished state law was clearly contra. Absent a showing of an
obvious conflict, there should be no independent inquiry into the
general state law, and the state judgment should be accepted if all
the other factors are satisfied. To hold otherwise would violate the
basic premise that the state decree has determined the "state law"
with respect to these particular property rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has established a new standard for
determining the effect of a state court adjudication of property rights
upon subsequent federal tax litigation, the scope and content of that
standard is unclear. Moreover, the approach employed by the Court
in formulating the new rule is subject to criticism. The interpretation
and application of the Bosch rule, which will be the function of the
circuit courts of appeal, hopefully will give content to the test and
will eliminate its analytical shortcomings. These ends will be attained
if the courts apply the standard in a manner designed to give effect
to the various interests of the taxpayer, the states, and the federal
treasury.
WmLM E. MARTIN
87. See Justice Fortas' dissent in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967).
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